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The Truth About Property Rules: Some Obstacles to the 
Economic Analysis of Remedies 
Emily Sherwin* 
 
Abstract 
 
Property Rules, as famously described by Calabresi and 
Melamed, are remedial rules that place a prohibitively high 
penalty on violations of rights. This essay examines two aspects of 
property rules. In each case, the form of the rule is critically 
important. The first question addressed is the capacity of property 
rules to affect behavior that takes place outside the context of 
litigation. Most economic analysis assumes that when a right is 
protected by a property rule, the property rule will guide private 
decisionmaking at the time of a contemplated violation, and 
possibly before that time. Yet, to have this effect, property rules 
(and liability rules) must be embodied in a set of determinate legal 
rules defining not only the penalty imposed on violation, but also 
the entitlements protected and the conditions on which the 
property-rule remedy is available. Property rules, in other words, 
must be rules. 
In fact, “true property rules” that meet this description are 
scarce. This casts some doubt on the predictions made in literature 
on the subject. Theory and doctrine may or may not be 
reconcilable, depending on the desirability and feasibility of 
determinate rules in the area of remedies. 
In existing law, most true property rules protect property 
rights. This leads to the second question addressed here: what 
relationship, if any, do property rules bear to property? After 
examining several theories others have proposed to explain the 
association between property rules and property rights, I suggest 
that property rules are connected to property in two ways. First, 
deterrent property rules ensure the continuity that makes property 
rights valuable to owners and to society. Second, once property 
rights are securely in place, the value they generate makes 
property rules a more efficient response to the possibility of 
unilateral taking. To achieve these results, however, both property 
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rights and property rules must be implemented by general, 
determinate, and authoritative legal rules. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed published 
their seminal article on the subject in 1972,1 economic analysis of 
                                                
1 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). This 
is one of the most widely and deeply cited articles of all times. See James E. 
Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations and 
Impressions, 106 YALE L.J. 2121 (1997). 
2 For a sampling of the literature inspired by Calabresi and Melamed’s article, 
see Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 269 
(2004); Ian Ayres & Jack Balkin, Legal Entitlements As Auctions: Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Paul 
M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability Rules, 
32 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2003) [hereinafter Ayres & Goldbart, Correlated 
Values]; Ian Ayres & Paul Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the 
Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Ayres & 
Goldbart, Optimal Delegation]; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic 
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasian Trade, 104 
YALE L. J. 1027 (1995); Lucian A Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability 
Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001); 
Richard R. W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and 
Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 267 
(2003); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in 
Unconscionability and Related Contract Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993); 
Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property 
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1399 (2005); Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability 
Rules Once Again, 2 REVIEW OF ECONOMICS 137 (2006); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules 
and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 
(1995); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149 (1997); Madeline Morris, The Structure of 
Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1993); A Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling 
Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and 
Tax Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979); A. Mitchell Polinsky, 
Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage 
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest 
Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 
(1998); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 
(1997); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 
(2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property]; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property 
Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, 
Exclusion]. 
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legal remedies has centered on the choice between “property rules” 
and “liability rules” for protection of entitlements. Calabresi and 
Melamed observed that a full description of any legal right entails 
not only who possesses the right but how the right is enforced.2 
Thus, in a case of industrial pollution, courts must choose not only 
whether to assign the entitlement (to pollute or to be free from 
pollution) to the factory or to homeowners, but whether to protect 
the entitlement by means of an injunction, which gives practical 
control to the entitlement holder, or with a damage remedy, which 
allows the non-entitled party to take the entitlement for a court-
determined price.3  
 In this article, I will suggest that the economic notion of a 
property rule relies on a critical assumption about the form of legal 
rules governing remedies. Specifically, a property rule capable of 
producing efficient outcomes must be embodied in a set of general, 
determinate, and authoritative rules. In fact, rules governing 
remedies tend to be at the low end of the continuum of legal 
determinacy, although perhaps they should be more rule-like than 
they are. This discrepancy between theory and practice places 
economic analysis of remedies in some jeopardy. 
 A further mystery pertaining to property rules is what 
relation, if any, they bear to what we typically think of as property 
rights. Property rules are linked to property rights in at least some 
economic analyses of remedial choice, yet the connection between 
them has not been fully explored. I will suggest that, although 
property rights and property rules are not coextensive, they have in 
common a strong dependence on determinate legal rules. 
 I assume, as most writers have done, that maximizing the 
value derived from resources is at least one of the objectives courts 
should pursue in choosing among remedies.4 Depending on one’s 
political morality, a choice based on efficiency can then be 
adjusted in response to distributive concerns or other deontological 
requirements. I will say nothing in this essay about distributive 
justice or the moral justifications for property rights; nor will I 
embark on a technical economic analysis of legal methods for 
enforcing rights. My aim is to examine the logical structure of the 
                                                
 
3 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092, 1115-24. 
4 See id. at 1093-94. I assume that efficiency is a valid normative objective for 
law, even if it does not in itself express a moral standard. Efficiency is a goal 
that morally sound political institutions can legitimately pursue. See Jody Kraus, 
Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical 
Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 302-03, 311-
313 (2007). 
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problem of remedial choice, with emphasis on the connections 
among property rules, property, and rules.5 
 
I.  PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES 
 
A. Basic Definitions 
 The essential characteristic of what Calabresi and Melamed 
called a property rule is that it effectively prevents deliberate 
unilateral violations of the right it protects.6 Consequently, those 
who wish to appropriate or otherwise interfere with the right must 
seek the rightholder’s consent. They must either bargain or abstain. 
 For simplicity, I will refer to violations of rights as 
“takings,” although the violation may consist of harm––invasion, 
appropriation, or unauthorized use. Potential violators are 
denominated “takers.” Rightholders are “victims” (or, when 
appropriate, “owners”). 
 Property rules deter takings by imposing strong penalties, 
such that no rational actor would choose to take without consent 
and suffer the legal consequences. A property rule may take the 
form of an injunction backed by contempt sanctions that negate 
expected benefits from violating the right, a criminal prohibition 
backed by similarly severe sanctions, an order for specific 
restitution, or an order requiring the taker to disgorge any benefits 
obtained.7 I shall have more to say in later sections about the 
                                                
5 Thomas Merrill examined the role of determinate rules early in the debate over 
property rules and liability rules. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, 
and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985). He 
and Henry Smith have continued to pursue questions of legal form in property 
law in a series of excellent articles. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerous Clausus 
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal 
Standardization]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract 
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) [hereinafter, Merrill & Smith, 
Property/Contract]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to 
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359, 385-88, 394-979795 
(2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Law & Economics]; Smith, Property, supra 
note 2, at 1727-28; Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 973-74. 
6 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092; Kaplow & Shavell, 
supra note 2, at 715. 
7 Much of the literature focuses on injunctions, but the other remedies 
mentioned in the text have similar deterrent effects. See, e.g., Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 1, at 1124-26 (discussing property rule protection through 
criminal sanctions); Epstein, supra note 2, at 2096-97 (discussing property rule 
protection through specific restitution); Levmore, supra note 2, at 2156-57 
(discussing property rule protection through profit-based restitution). 
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formal requirements for property rules.  
 A liability rule, in contrast, does not aim to prevent 
unilateral rights violations. Instead, it requires violators to pay a 
court-determined price for what they take.8 With the price in mind, 
potential takers may bargain, abstain, or proceed to take without 
consent. Ideally, the price is calculated to ensure that would-be 
takers will take if but only if the benefits to them exceed the cost to 
their victims.9 
 
B.  Effects of Property Rules and Liability Rules 
1. Efficient Allocation of Resources 
  For most writers who have addressed the subject of 
property rules and liability rules, the primary motive in choosing 
between them is to place whatever resources are at stake in the 
hands of the party who values them most. The impact of remedial 
choice on resource allocation has been and continues to be a 
subject of intense debate. In their original discussion of property 
rules and liability rules, Calabresi and Melamed surmised that 
when the costs of bargaining are low, property rules are superior 
because they encourage private bargaining, and bargaining is more 
likely to produce an efficient allocation than forced exchange at an 
officially determined price. When bargaining costs are high, 
liability rules are superior because they permit exchanges to occur 
at the designated price.  
 Subsequent writers have questioned and refined Calabresi’s 
and Melamed’s conclusions. For example, James Krier and Stewart 
Schwab draw attention to “assessment costs,” meaning the 
difficulties courts face in calculating values for the related risk of 
error.10 When the costs of private bargaining are prohibitively 
high, a property rule based on a mistaken assessment of the parties’ 
                                                
8 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092; Kaplow & Shavell, 
supra note 2, at 723-24. 
9 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 724-28; A. Mitchell Polinski, 
Resolving Nuisance Disputes, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1101-02 (1980). For 
varying proposals for calculating optimal liability rule prices when courts do not 
have perfect information about the parties’ subjective values, see, for example, 
id. at 725-26 (defending liability rules based on average victim value); Ayres & 
Goldbart, Correlated Values, supra note 2, at 134-39 (defending liability rules 
based on a “conditional mean value” reflecting the point at which the taker’s 
value equal the mean probable value of victims, given a known correlation in 
values). 
10 Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 453-64; see also Polinski, supra note 9, at 
1101-06 (concluding that neither property rules nor liability rules are generally 
superior when courts have imperfect information about values).  
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subjective valuations directly misallocates resources. A liability 
rule that misjudges the value the victim places on the resources 
results in too many or too few unilateral takings.  
 Others have argued that liability rules are generally 
superior to property rules as tools for allocating disputed resources. 
Ian Ayres and Eric Talley propose that when bargaining is 
possible, liability rules facilitate agreement by splitting the right to 
resources between parties; each party then has a reason to reveal 
information about his or her private valuation.11 Louis Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell show that when bargaining costs are high, liability 
rules have the advantage of capturing private information. By 
putting potential takers to a choice, liability rules make use of 
takers’ knowledge of their own valuations, which may otherwise 
be inaccessible to the court.12 It follows that, at least in the 
paradigmatic nuisance case, a liability rule based on a rough 
estimate of average victim value will be superior on average to a 
property rule in favor of either the victim or the taker.13 
 Scholarly commentary has also produced a variety of 
arguments in defense of property rules. Kaplow and Shavell, for 
example, qualify their general conclusion in favor of liability rules 
with the observation that property rules may be more efficient 
when the taking consists of misappropriation of a physical thing.14 
Henry Smith pursues a different line of argument, maintaining that 
a regime of exclusionary property rights, backed by property rules, 
is often the best way to generate and manage information about the 
                                                
11 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 2; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing 
Between Consensual and Nonconsenual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 
YALE L.J. 235 (1995). 
12 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 719-20, 724-28; see also Ayres & 
Goldbart, Optimal Delegation, supra note 2 (proposing liability rules that 
manipulate the locus of choice to maximize the use of private information); 
Fennell, supra note 1 (proposing liability rules that require parties to generate 
serial options). 
 Kaplow and Shavell do not claim that liability rules are superior in all 
circumstances. They note that when bargaining costs are high but not 
prohibitive, as when both parties lack information about the other’s actual 
valuation but know the average distribution of values among similarly situated 
parties, neither property rules nor liability rules are systematically superior. 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra, at 734-35. They also argue that property rules are 
likely to be superior in the particular setting of appropriation of things, discussed 
below. Id. at 721-23, 759-63. 
13 For this purpose, Kaplow and Shavell assume that although the estimate of 
victim value may be rough, it is not systematically biased against victims. 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 720, 730-31. 
14 See id. at 721-23, 759-63. 
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use of resources.15 I shall return to both these arguments later in 
the essay, when I address the relationship between property rules 
and property rights. 
 
2. The Time-Frame Problem: Prospective Effects of 
Remedial Choice 
 I take no position in the debate over the relative efficiency 
of property rules and liability rules. My purpose in summarizing a 
sample of the arguments made on this question is to highlight a 
problem that sometimes has been overlooked: in order to assess the 
impact of remedies on resource allocation, one must be clear about 
the time frame in which they operate. On this point, the literature 
on property rules and liability rules is surprisingly indistinct. Yet 
the problem of time has significant implications for both the scope 
of remedial theory and the form of remedial rules. 
 One possibility is to assess the effect of property rules and 
liability rules at the time a court chooses between them. A 
particular dispute has arisen, the parties are before the court, and 
the question is how the court’s choice of remedy, in this case, will 
affect final placement of the resources at stake in the litigation. If 
post-judgment bargaining is possible, the court’s assignment of the 
resources is open to further negotiation, and the choice between a 
property rule and a liability rule may affect the chance of a 
successful agreement. For example, as Ayres and Talley have 
argued, a liability rule may raise the prospects for agreement by 
encouraging the parties to reveal information.16 If post-judgment 
bargaining is not feasible, the court’s assignment of resources is 
final and the choice of remedy has only distributive effects. 
 The court’s choice of remedy in a particular case also 
affects the administrative costs borne by the parties and the court.17 
A liability rule requires a cardinal estimate of the value the victim 
places on resources; a property rule requires an ordinal ranking of 
                                                
15 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1753-90; Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, 
at 980. See also Epstein, supra note 2, at 2094-95 (emphasizing the risk of 
undercompensation); Rose, supra note 2, at 2187 (suggesting that property rules 
facilitate long-term planning); Hylton, supra note 2, at 140 (arguing that 
property rules provide better protection for subjective values). 
16 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
17
  See Brooks, supra note 2 (analyzing costs imposed on the court, independently 
of errors resulting in misallocation of resources between parties), Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 1, at 1093 (citing administrative costs as a relevant 
consideration); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 741 (discussing 
administrative costs).  
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both parties’ valuations.18 One or the other of these measurements 
may be more costly, depending on the setting.19 A liability rule 
also may require the victim to reveal information he or she would 
prefer to keep confidential.20 A property rule may involve the court 
in monitoring compliance after judgment. Costs of this kind 
consume resources, even if they do not affect the final allocation 
between parties. 
 A second possibility is to step back in time and ask what 
impact a property rule or a liability rule may have on the initial 
private decision whether to violate a right. Anticipating a property 
rule, potential takers will not take (or will not engage in activities 
likely to violate rights). Instead, would-be takers will either make 
an offer or take no action. Anticipating a liability rule, potential 
takers will either take, bargain, or do nothing, depending on the 
price. From this perspective, the most important economic 
consequences of remedial choice occur prior to, and outside the 
context of, litigation. 
 The assumption that the choice of remedy affects behavior 
at the point of taking greatly enlarges the scope of the inquiry. 
Most obviously, the costs of bargaining at the time of taking are 
now factors to consider in assessing the efficiency of different 
rules. If pre-taking bargaining costs are low, then in theory the 
parties can and will reach a correct allocation of resources on their 
own, regardless of expected remedies.21 Efficient exchanges will 
occur and inefficient exchanges will not, without the intervention 
of a court. If pre-taking bargaining costs are high, then the 
expected remedy determines whether takings will occur.22 If takers 
believe that courts will apply a property rule in favor of victims, or 
a liability rule that fixes a price above the taker’s value, there will 
                                                
18 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 69-70 (7th ed. 2007) 
(noting that, given sufficient information, it is cheaper to compare the relative 
values of both parties’ uses than to determine the value of one victim’s use). See 
generally Russell Hardin, Rational Choice, in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 
1062, 1063-64 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., New York; 
London: Garland Publishing 1992) (discussing cardinal and ordinal utility 
measurement). 
19 See Brooks, supra note 2, at 277-96 (identifying variations in judicial 
information that affect assessment costs under different rules). 
20 Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa Bernstein have suggested that in contractual 
disputes, measurement of the promisee’s expectancy depends on information 
about profits and value that, if public, could weaken the promisee’s position in 
subsequent dealings with the promisor and others. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa 
Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000). 
21 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 733-34. 
22 See id. at 724. 
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be no takings, although takers may sometimes place a higher value 
on the resources more than victims. If takers believe that the court 
will apply a property rule in favor of takers, or a liability rule that 
fixes a price below the taker’s value, the taking will occur, 
although victims may place a higher value on the resources. There 
may, in other words, be too many or too few takings, again with no 
involvement by a court. 
 To complicate matters, the parties’ remedial expectations 
may affect the costs of pre-taking bargaining. For example, as 
Kaplow and Shavell point out, a liability rule may force victims 
who expect to suffer harm that exceeds the damages fixed by the 
rule to bargain with multiple potential takers.23 In theory, when 
damages are too low the victim can pay takers to refrain from 
taking. The low price, however, may attract an indefinite number 
of takers. If so, the owner cannot practically bargain to retain the 
right, even if bargaining costs are otherwise insignificant.24  
 When pre-taking bargaining costs are high, the costs of 
judicial valuation, and the corresponding likelihood of judicial 
error, must be added to the equation. If potential takers anticipate 
                                                
23 See id. at 765-67. Kaplow and Shavell associate this problem with takings of 
physical things. In a nuisance dispute between two neighbors, presumably the 
owner can bargain with the taker; in a case of misappropriation, many would 
find it rational to take advantage of an erroneously low liability rule. See id. at 
766-67. Yet the problem may be more general. 
 There is an interesting parallel between the difficulty a victim faces in 
bargaining out of multiple possible takings, and the reasons why the law is 
property laws and markets are structured to permit owners to demand prices 
from potential buyers, rather than requiring owners to pay for the benefit of 
continued possession. See Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for 
Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (1984). 
24 Post-judgment bargaining costs may also be relevant, insofar as they affect the 
final allocation of resources between parties whose pre-taking decisions are 
shaped by the remedial rules. For example, suppose that an undercompensatory 
liability rule leads to an inefficient taking, and pre-taking bargaining costs 
prevent the victim from buying off the taker in advance. Suppose also that post-
judgment bargaining costs are lower, perhaps because the parties have obtained 
better information about their respective valuations in the course of trial. The 
victim may then be able to recover what was taken by offering an additional 
payment. If so, the misallocation is thus correctable after the fact; and if this 
pattern is predictable, the initial inefficiency of the liability rule is of less 
concern. However, if post-judgment bargaining carries other costs that are likely 
to prevent agreement, the defects of the liability rule cannot be cured. 
 This scenario assumes a manageable number of potential takers. If pre-
taking bargaining is costly because there are many potential takers, the owner is 
unlikely to offer a post-judgment buy-off because the risk of further takings 
would make the buy-off pointless. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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that courts will systematically misapply the governing rule, giving 
property rule protection to the wrong party or fixing damages too 
high or too low under a liability rule, they will adjust their 
decisions accordingly.25 The likelihood of error, in turn, depends 
on the type of information available to the court in different 
settings, as well as the governing remedial rule. If courts are likely 
to have reliable information about the distribution of victim 
valuations but not about the actual valuations of particular parties, 
then, as Kaplow and Shavell point out, liability rules will normally 
perform better on average than property rules because they make 
use of takers’ private knowledge.26 If courts are likely to have 
access to information about actual valuations, the ordinal 
calculation associated with property rules may be simpler, and 
therefore more accurate, than the cardinal estimate of victim value 
needed for a liability rule.27  
 Administrative and other costs associated with property 
rules and liability rules can also affect decisionmaking at the point 
of taking. A rule that imposes high costs on victims in case of 
litigation weakens a victim’s bargaining position at the time of 
taking because the victim’s threat to sue is less credible. Similarly, 
if litigation under the governing rule will require one party to 
disclose information he or she would prefer to keep private, and 
both parties know this, bargaining positions at the time of taking 
will reflect the costs of disclosure.28 
 Finally, analysis of property rules and liability rules can be 
extended to even earlier points in time, when the parties choose 
among possible uses of resources.29 Anticipating that particular 
                                                
25 Kaplow and Shavell note that if courts systematically underestimate damages, 
it is no longer fair to assume that liability rules are more reliable. See Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 2, at 730-31. There is ample reason to think that damages 
are often undercompensatory. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Compensation and 
Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389-96 (2003); Jeffrey Standen, The 
Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 145 (1995). 
26 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
27 See Brooks, supra note 2, at 279 (noting that judges generally “have some 
knowledge of the specific parties’ valuations”). 
28 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
29 Lucien Bebchuk undertakes this task, analyzing how the anticipated division 
of surplus in what he refers to as “ex post” bargaining may affect incentives for 
initial investment in productive activity and in measures to prevent harmful 
takings. Lucien Ayre Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex 
Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001). By ex post 
bargaining, Bebchuk appears to mean any bargaining that occurs after the parties 
have chosen and invested in activities, including both post-judgment and pre-
taking bargaining. Given Bebchuk’s assumption of perfect bargaining 
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activities may ultimately conflict, that the conflict may be resolved 
in court, and that the court will choose a property rule or a liability 
rule, parties will structure their investments accordingly. If the 
costs of later bargaining are high, the expected rule will guide 
investment; if bargaining costs are low, investment decisions will 
be influenced by the effects of the governing rule on the division of 
bargaining surplus.30 Parties may also take into account the 
different methods of assessing value courts are likely use under 
property rules or liability rules in the event of litigation over 
conflicting uses, and adjust their activities in ways they hope will 
affect valuation.31 
  
3. Prospectivity and Rules 
 Whatever specific conclusions one may draw about how 
property rules and liability rules operate under varying conditions, 
the economic significance of the choice between them depends on 
the extent to which the choice is prospective in effect. Not 
surprisingly, most writing on the subject takes as a premise that the 
effects of remedial choice extend at least to the point of taking and 
perhaps even further back in time. Yet very little attention has been 
paid to the form that property rules and liability rules must take to 
support this premise. 
 Choice among legal remedies can proceed in two ways: 
courts can select remedies case-by-case at the conclusion of trial, 
or lawmakers (courts or legislatures) can select remedies for 
classes of cases in advance of litigation, by means of remedial 
rules. Particularistic remedial choices affect only post-litigation 
behavior and administrative costs. Therefore, any analysis of 
property rules and liability rules that attributes broader effects to 
the choice of remedies necessarily assumes the existence of 
property rule rules and liability rule rules. It assumes, in other 
words, that remedial choices by courts or other lawmakers meet 
three formal criteria. They must be general, meaning that they 
                                                                                                         
conditions, the timing of the ex post bargain is not significant. Bebchuk 
concludes that when bargaining is possible, different remedies (and different 
entitlements) will elicit mixed combinations of behavior by the parties, 
depending on context. 
30 See id. at 612-34 (assuming perfect bargaining conditions and examining the 
“ex ante” effects of the expected division of surplus under property rules or 
liability rules) (emphasis added). 
31 See Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal 
Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 685-96 (2002) (suggesting that under liability rules, 
parties may respond strategically to the prospect of qualitative assessment of 
value by altering features of the subject matter that serve as proxies for value). 
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apply to classes of future cases. They must be determinate, 
meaning that the terms in which they are expressed can be 
understood and applied by future courts without recourse to 
contestable moral standards. They must also be treated as 
authoritative by future courts. Only then can remedial choices 
operate as rules.32 
 This is a simple point, but it leads to considerably more 
restrictive definitions of property rules and liability rules than 
commonly appear in the literature. Suppose, for example, that the 
best rule for a certain class of cases is a property rule in favor of 
victims (or, more precisely, a property rule rule in favor of 
victims). The function of a property rule is to prevent unilateral 
takings. If the rule is to perform this function prior to, and outside, 
litigation, the law must first define both the victim’s substantive 
entitlement and the choice of remedy in determinate terms.  
 It follows that a right that depends on a balance of interests 
in context cannot effectively be protected by a litigation-
independent property rule. For example, the Restatement of Torts 
defines nuisance as an unreasonable interference with enjoyment 
of land and reasonableness as a function of the private and societal 
interests at stake.33  When this definition prevails, even a clear 
property rule, providing for routine injunctive relief, will not fully 
deter activities that might qualify as nuisances.34 
 Assuming a determinate entitlement, the conditions under 
which courts will grant a deterrent remedy––that is, the criteria for 
selection of a property rule rather a liability rule––must also be 
defined in determinate terms. If injunctive relief for an 
acknowledged nuisance depends on the social value of the 
defendant’s activity or other criteria on which courts are likely to 
disagree, nuisances may still occur. The remedial rule must also 
provide for sanctions that negate any benefits a taker might obtain 
by violating the right, and the sanctions must follow automatically 
                                                
32 For an excellent discussion of the nature, requisites, and advantages of 
authoritative rules, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LIFE AND 
LAW (1991). See also LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF 
RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 26-36 (2001) 
(discussing the characteristics of authoritative rules). 
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). 
34
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826 (1979) (comparing gravity 
of harm to utility of conduct). But cf. Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 993, 
997-1005, 1024 (arguing that nuisance law often relies on simple rules of 
exclusion). 
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whenever the criteria for application of the rule are met.35 A degree 
of uncertainty about the level of expected sanctions will not 
necessarily undermine the deterrent effect of the rule, as long as 
takers face a distribution of expected penalties in which the 
average penalty is equal to the takers’ expected benefit.  Yet, the 
choice between a deterrent property rule and a non-deterrent 
liability rule must be clear: remedial standards that leave the choice 
of remedy uncertain have neither the protective effects of property 
rules nor the pricing effects of accurate liability rules. 
 Finally, the rule must be announced as a rule by an 
authority whose decisions courts accept as binding in all cases.  If 
the source of the rule is a court, the court’s decisions on remedial 
questions must have the status of authoritative precedent rules.36 
To the extent that future courts treat prior decisions as examples or 
rules of thumb, prior decisions do not establish property rules. 
 Thus, a property rule capable of operating in advance of 
litigation––what I will call a true property rule––must instruct 
future courts to apply fully deterrent sanctions, under determinate 
conditions, for protection of a clearly defined class of entitlements, 
without further consideration of the specifics of the case at hand. 
Liability rules are subject to similar constraints, if they are 
intended to affect pre-litigation decisionmaking directly.37 The 
entitlement must be defined and assigned in determinate terms; the 
choice of remedy must be specified for an ascertainable class of 
cases; and the price must be fixed for all cases to which the rule 
applies. The price may refer to a probability distribution, such as 
average victim value, but the formula for calculating prices in 
                                                
35 See Hylton, supra note 2, at 178-83 (arguing that a property rule must fix a 
price equal to the greater of the taker’s valuation or the victim’s subjective 
valuation, in order to fully protect subjective values).  
 The question what sanctions are necessary to deter takings is 
complicated by imperfections in the process of enforcement including, most 
obviously, the probability that not all victims will sue. See, e.g., A. Mitchell 
Polinksy & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and 
Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1979). 
36 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 140-42 (discussing the “rule 
model” of precedent); see also Larry Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 62 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17-28 (same). 
37 Indeterminate liability rules, or for that matter indeterminate legal standards of 
any kind, may affect private bargaining. See Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining 
Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG 256 (1995) (suggesting 
that, under certain conditions, bargaining is enhanced by vaguely defined 
entitlements). Indeterminate standards, however, will not direct resource 
allocation in the manner contemplated in most literature on property rules and 
liability rules. 
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particular cases must be determinate.38  
 In fact, true property rules are rather scarce. The remedy 
most typically associated with property-rule protection for 
entitlements is an injunction, backed by the threat of sanctions for 
contempt. Injunctions, however, are historically equitable 
remedies, subject to discretionary control by the issuing court.39 In 
a few categories of cases, courts routinely grant injunctions; more 
typically, however, the choice between damages and an injunction 
is a fact-specific decision, based on considerations such as 
propensity to act, probability of harm, and the likelihood that 
damages will provide fair compensation if harm occurs.40 
Injunctions are also subject to “equitable defenses” that refer to 
vague principles of morality and fairness, such as “unclean hands” 
or “disproportionate hardship.”41 
 Punitive damages, available in civil proceedings, may 
contribute to deterrence.42 Yet the law provides very little guidance 
on either the availability of punitive damages in particular contexts 
or the measure of punitive damages when they apply.43 Thus, at 
                                                
38 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
39
 See generally 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-
EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 1.2 at 12, § 2.1(2) at 59, § 2.4(1) at 90-91 (2d ed. 1993). 
40 See generally id.; DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 233-
57(3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LAYCOCK, REMEDIES]. Laycock has demonstrated 
through extensive research that courts rarely rely on the supposed requirement 
of “irreparable injury” (or “inadequacy” of legal remedies) as an independent 
reason to deny injunctive relief. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE 
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULES (1991). This is not to say, however, that they grant 
injunctions routinely, without evaluating the impact of the remedy in the context 
of a particular dispute. 
 Moreover, courts grant both preliminary injunctions, at the outset of 
litigation, and permanent injunctions, after trial, applying different standards that 
reflect the degree of factual uncertainty at different stages of adjudication. See 1 
DOBBS, supra note 39, at § 2.11(1) at 249-50; LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra, at 
440-77. 
41 See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 2.4(1) at 91; § 2.4(2) at 92-99, § 
2.4(5) at 108-113. 
42 See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 3.11(1) at 452-57; LAYCOCK, 
REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 719-38. 
43 In an effort to control punitive damages, the United States Supreme Court has 
recently suggested that the Constitution may require a degree proportionality 
between compensatory and punitive remedies. See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); 
Phillip Morris USA v. William, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). Yet even the rather loose 
restrictions proposed by the Court have met with resistance from state courts and 
lower federal courts. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 98 
P.3d 409 (Utah 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 874 (2004) (awarding the 
maximum amount approved by the Supreme Court); Mathias v. Accor Econ. 
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least for parties who do not expect to litigate repeatedly over harms 
arising from a single activity, the prospect of punitive damages is 
unlikely to operate as a true property rule.44 
 A more promising form of property rule is restitution of 
profits.45 By definition, a remedy that allows victims to claim their 
injurers’ full profits is an effective deterrent because it eliminates 
potential gains from taking, including economic gains in the form 
of saved costs.46 Moreover, the criteria for profit-based restitution 
are relatively clear: for particular categories of wrongdoing, such 
as misappropriation of another’s assets, conscious wrongdoers are 
routinely required to account for profits.47 Yet full disgorgement of 
profits is a fairly limited remedy, which does not apply to all forms 
of deliberate or reckless wrongs. Notably, restitution of profits (or 
                                                                                                         
Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding special circumstances). 
44 A manufacturer expecting multiple products liability suits may calculate and 
respond to the statistical probability of punitive damages. See Baker v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998) (in which General Motors attempted to block 
testimony by a former employee in the wake of large punitive damage awards 
against auto manufacturers). 
 There are substantial questions about the desirability of effective 
property rules in the context of products liability. Despite occasional awards of 
significant punitive damages, there probably is no social consensus in favor of 
deterring commercial activities that carry known risks of serious harm. For 
discussion of the problem, see LAYCOCK, REMEDIES supra note 40, at 598-600, 
729-30 (addressing disgorgement of profits and punitive damages, respectively). 
45 Douglas Laycock helpfully refers to profit-based restitution as restitution of 
“consequential gains.” LAYCOCK, REMEDIES supra note 40, at 575. The draft 
Restatement adopts the same term. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 53(3) (Tentative Draft No. 5 2007). See also 1 DOBBS, 
supra note 39, § 4.5(3) at 637-41. 
46 See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946). 
47
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
40(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); § 51(3), cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5, 
2007); LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 585. Innocent wrongdoers 
normally are not liable for profits. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 45, § 40(2)(b); LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra 
note 40, at 585 (noting an exception in the case of copyright infringement).  
 There are also cases in which the criteria for disgorgement are far from 
clear, notably constructive trusts imposed on grounds such as breach of fiduciary 
duty and undue influence, or, on simply on the basis of unjust enrichment. See, 
e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (imposing a constructive trust 
on a former CIA agent for breach of fiduciary duties arising from a contractual 
obligation to submit proposed publications to the agency for review); Sharp v. 
Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1976) (imposing a constructive trust on the 
plaintiff’s former cohabitant for breach of fiduciary duties implicit in the parties’ 
relationship). Deterrent remedies in cases of this kind do not operate as true 
property rules because they are not embodied in rules.  
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saved costs) is not ordinarily available for breach of contract48 or 
for injuries caused by defective products.49 
 Another possible source of deterrence is the criminal law.50 
The conditions for imposing criminal punishment and the extent of 
the penalty typically are specified in advance by legislation. As a 
consequence, criminal penalties can operate as true property rules, 
if the probable penalty is severe enough to negate the benefits of 
unilateral taking. Criminal laws, however, do not cover all forms 
of rights violation, and the penalties they impose for mundane 
takings may be inadequate to deter.51 
 Many, though not all, of the instances in which the law 
approaches true property rule protection involve property rights. 
Property rights tend to be relatively determinate, and remedial 
rules provide for deterrent remedies for violation of property rights 
in relatively well-defined circumstances. Thus, as noted, profit-
based restitution is a standard remedy for intentional 
misappropriation of property.52 Similarly, injunctions are 
presumptively available in cases of repeated trespass to land,53 
interference with easements,54 misappropriation of intellectual 
property,55 and breach of contracts for sale of land.56 
 The correspondence between property rights and true 
property rules is far from perfect. Not all property rights are 
protected by property rules,57 and rules that call for property rule 
                                                
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 (1981); 1 DOBBS, supra 
note 39, § 4.5(3) at 644-45. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (recognizing a claim to 
profits from “opportunistic breach); LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 
600-603 (noting some exceptions to the general rule). 
49 See LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 599.  
50 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1124-27. 
51 See, e.g., Jacque v. Sternberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wisc. 1997) (noting 
that defendants were fined $30 for trespassing on the plaintiff’s land) ; see also 
infra note 58 and accompanying text.   
52 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
40(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005); see also supra note 45 and 
accompanying text. Some intellectual property statutes provide for restitution of 
profits, other do not; however, the statutes give courts considerable discretion in 
awarding profits. See generally 2 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 6.2(1) at 41, § 6.3(4) 
at 59; § 6.4(4) at 87-80; LAYCOCK, REMEDIES, supra note 40, at 584-85. 
53 See 1 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 5.10(3) at 809. 
54 See id. § 5.7(6) at 785. 
55 See 2 id. § 6.2(5) at 43-44; § 6.3(5) at 64-65; § 6.4(5) at 95-96. 
56 See 3 id. § 12.11(3) at 299-300. 
57 One significant exception is accident cases: when a legal thing is inadvertently 
invaded or destroyed, deterrence is not possible and courts must resort to 
liability rules. By their nature, however, accidents are beyond the reach of any 
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protection against violation property rights are seldom perfectly 
determinate.58 Nevertheless, reasonably reliable deterrent remedies 
are more common in the field of property than in other areas of 
law. I shall return later to the association between true property 
rules and property rights. 
 As an illustration of the elusiveness of true property rules, 
even when property rights are at stake, consider Jacque v. 
Sternberg Homes.59 Sternberg sought permission to cross the 
plaintiffs’ land to deliver a mobile home after a snowstorm made 
normal routes impassible. When the Jacques refused, the defendant 
proceeded to cross their land. A jury ultimately held Sternberg 
liable for nominal damages of $1 and punitive damages of 
$100,000, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved.60 This 
case may appear to establish true property rule protection against 
unauthorized crossing of the boundaries of private land. In fact, 
however, the award of punitive damages depended on the jury’s 
conception of egregious conduct, and other deterrent remedies 
                                                                                                         
theory about the prospective effects of remedial choice. 
 There are also instances in which property rule protection is possible, 
but courts decline to use it. For example, traditional rules hold that profit-based 
restitution is not available when a trespasser enters land without consent and 
profits from the entry, but leaves the land intact. See 1 id. § 5.9, at 800-02. The 
draft Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment adopts the contrary 
view, allowing recovery of profits. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40(2)(a), cmt. c, illus. 4 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
See also Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 W.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936) (allowing 
recovery of profits from use of a cave under the plaintiff’s land). The remedy 
recognized by the Restatement, however, may not qualify as a true property rule; 
the comments refer to remoteness of profits and the “equitable positions of the 
parties” as possible qualifications, even when the defendant is a conscious 
wrongdoer. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 40(2)(a), cmt. c, illus. 4, 7. 
 Another example is fungible goods. When a defendant misappropriates 
fungible property and “confuses” it with similar property of the defendant, 
courts are likely to limit the remedy to damages, rather than allow the plaintiff to 
recover the commingled mass, even when the taking was deliberate. See, e.g., 
Somer v. Kane, 210 N.W. 287 (Minn. 1926) (denying replevin of commingled 
logs). Similarly, when a defendant breaches a contract to deliver fungible goods, 
courts typically refuse to grant specific performance (or replevin) and instead 
limit the buyer’s remedy to damages. See U.C.C. § 2-716(1), (3).  
58
 Injunctive relief, in particular, is always subject to the defense of 
disproportionate hardship, even in categories of cases in which injunctions are 
otherwise the preferred method of enforcement. See, e.g., Van Wagner Advert. 
Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E. 756 (N.Y. 1986) (denying specific 
performance). 
59 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wisc. 1997). 
60 Id. at 166 (reinstating the jury’s verdict). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 Jurisprudence Review [March 
 
56 
were unlikely to apply. To obtain an injunction in advance, the 
Jacques would need to know of Sternberg’s plans, and to prove 
both Sternberg’s propensity to act and the comparative inadequacy 
of damages. Profit-based restitution probably was not a viable 
option, due to the difficulty of establishing the defendant’s saved 
costs.61 The criminal penalty for trespass was $30. Thus, even in 
the core case of entry onto private land, property rule protection 
may not be sufficiently certain and thorough to deter a unilateral 
violation of rights.62 
 
4. Implications for Economic Analysis 
 As administered by courts, property rules and liability rules 
often do not operate as rules. The paradigmatic property rule––an 
injunction––is a case-specific remedy, which is not easily 
predictable in advance of litigation. Standards for awarding for 
punitive damages are similarly indeterminate. Other potential 
property rules are more determinate in application but are limited 
in scope. Under current legal standards, therefore, the choice 
between property rule protection and liability rule protection for 
entitlements is most often a retrospective choice at the conclusion 
of litigation, the effects of which are limited to administrative costs 
and post-litigation decisionmaking by the particular parties 
involved. 
 As a result, much of the existing economic analysis of 
property rules and liability rules suffers to some extent, and 
possibly to a significant extent, from a descriptive mismatch with 
the law. Under existing remedial rules, private parties may be able 
to make a rough prediction of remedial probabilities. Still, the 
uncertainties of judicial practice in the area of remedies suggest 
that the impact of remedial choice on private decisionmaking may 
be considerably more modest than commentators have assumed. 
 One feature of the law of remedies may ameliorate the 
descriptive problem. The set of legal rules familiar to the public is 
not always the same as the set of rules that actually governs 
judicial decisionmaking.63 As a result, private decisionmakers may 
                                                
61 The Jacques’ claim might also fail under the traditional rule that profit-based 
restitution is not available for trespass that causes no harm. See supra note 55. 
62 Of course, Sternberg is unlikely to try this again. 
63 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 88 (discussing strategies of 
public deception to encourage conformity to rules); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision 
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 625, 630-36 (1984) (discussing “selective transmission” of legal rules in 
the criminal law); Emily Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 
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expect to be governed by a somewhat different, and more clear-cut, 
set of remedial rules than courts would actually apply in litigation. 
For example, an actor with some awareness of law may understand 
that it is unlawful to enter another’s land without consent, that 
violators are subject to criminal penalties, and possibly that 
continuing violations will be enjoined. But only those with 
significant legal experience are likely to know the amount of the 
penalty for criminal trespass, or to understand that a court 
adjudicating a trespass case will compare the efficacy of damages 
and weigh hardships before granting an injunction. Accordingly, 
potential trespassers who fall into the first category (some 
awareness) may choose their course of action as if a true property 
rule were in place. Gaps of this kind, between the “conduct rules” 
on which people act and the “decision rules” applied by judges,64 
are particularly likely to arise in the area of remedies, in which 
presumptive rules are often subject to arcane exceptions or judicial 
discretion. As a result, the actual prospective effect of property 
rules may be greater than the law of remedies might suggest. 
 Yet, the possibility that popular understanding of remedial 
rules may diverge from judicial application of remedial rules does 
not eliminate the descriptive mismatch between economic analysis 
of remedies and the practices of courts. The impact of popular 
understandings of law on decisionmaking is difficult if not 
impossible to assess, and in any event the rules applied by courts 
are accessible to those who receive competent legal advice. 
Moreover, popular understandings that diverge from judicial 
decision rules are inherently unstable: if decision rules come to 
light, popular understandings, and any expectations they may have 
generated, have no further effect.65 
 If economic analysis of remedies fails as a matter of 
descriptive accuracy, it may nevertheless succeed on a normative 
basis. Current remedies doctrine may be too indeterminate to guide 
private decisionmaking in advance of litigation. But if remedies are 
capable in theory of generating efficient decisions, this may be a 
reason to adopt more determinate remedial rules. 
 The normative case for reforming remedies doctrine to 
accommodate economic insights depends in part on the general 
                                                                                                         
MD. L. REV. 253, 263-64 (1991) (noting similar patterns in contract 
enforcement). See also GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 403, 448-52 (1986) (discussing Bentham’s theory of adjudication). 
64 These are Meir Dan-Cohen’s terms. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 63. 
65 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 89 (discussing the dangers of 
public deception). 
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desirability of determinate rules in this area of law. Determinate 
rules provide guidance, coordination, and potentially beneficial 
incentives at the cost of underinclusiveness and 
overinclusiveness.66 Because rules apply to classes of cases, a 
certain percentage of the outcomes prescribed by any rule will be 
mistaken when judged by the reasons underlying the rule.67 If the 
benefits of the rule––in this case, more efficient private decisions–
–exceed the costs resulting from mistaken outcomes, the rule is 
sound and mistakes must be tolerated to preserve the integrity of 
the rule. If not, the rule is not a justified rule. Accordingly, the 
question to be asked, with respect to any proposed remedial rule, is 
whether a determinate rule will generate efficiency gains that 
exceed whatever losses in efficiency, or costs of other kinds, result 
from the bluntness of the rule.68 
 The literature on property rules and liability rules has 
yielded a number of sophisticated proposals for rules designed to 
maximize efficiency gains by forcing parties to reveal private 
information.69 Insights of this kind may limit the errors caused by 
overly blunt remedial rules. At some point, however, a rule may 
fail to provide effective guidance, not because it lacks determinacy 
but because it is too complex for private actors to understand and 
apply.70 
 The unavoidable bluntness of rules also complicates the 
requirement that if remedial rules are to influence pre-litigation 
decisionmaking, they must be accepted as authoritative by future 
courts. From an economic standpoint, the errors that accompany 
determinate rules are simply costs that must be balanced against 
the benefits of remedial rules capable of eliciting efficient private 
                                                
66 For a full discussion of the benefits of rules, see Schauer, supra note 32, at 77-
134. On the value of coordination, see, for example, JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 49-50 (1986); SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 162-66; 
Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundation of Law, 11 
J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 172-86 (1982); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: 
Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1006-10 
(1989). 
67 See SCHAUER, supra note 32, at 31-34, 48-54. 
68 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 54 (discussing the dilemma of 
rules); RAZ, supra note 66, at 70-80 (discussing the “normal justification” of 
rules). 
69 See, e.g., Ayres & Goldbart, Optimal Delegation, supra note 2, at 16-61; 
Ayres & Goldbart, Correlated Values, supra note 2, at 134-47; Fennell, supra 
note 2, at 1433-44; Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 470-75; Morris, supra note 
2, at 849-75. 
70 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 32, at 32-34 (noting that rules that 
rely on objective criteria may nevertheless be indeterminate). 
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decisions. Judges, however, may find it irrational to follow a rule 
that prescribes an inefficient or unjust result in a particular case.71 
Even for judges who appreciate the value of rules, the concrete 
facts of the case at hand may have a psychological salience that 
overshadows the comparatively remote economic benefits of 
reliable rules.72 Public dissatisfaction with bad outcomes in 
individual may also prompt judges to deviate from rules. If, in 
response to these pressures, judges regularly make exceptions in 
recalcitrant cases, the rules will be less reliable and consequently 
will have less effect on private decisionmaking. 
 If judges are unable to comply with determinate remedial 
rules, or if the costs of determinate rules exceed their allocative 
benefits, the project of eliciting efficient private decisions through 
remedial choice is not viable. At the same time, the current 
indeterminacy of remedial rules does not necessarily indicate that 
greater determinacy is undesirable or unfeasible. The path 
dependency of the common law, and the odd historical influence of 
the English Chancery court on the development of remedies 
doctrine, can easily explain why more determinate remedial rules 
have not evolved.73 The normative question, therefore, remains 
open. 
 
II.  PROPERTY 
 
 To recap: the economic significance of the choice between 
property rules and liability rules as means of protecting 
entitlements is far greater when legal remedies take the form of 
rules. If a property rule is simply the remedial outcome of a 
particular litigation, its effects are necessarily limited to the costs it 
                                                
71 On the rationality of judicial adherence to rules, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, 
supra note 32, at 77-86; HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 62-94 (1999). 
72 Behavioral psychologists have noted that readily “available” facts tend to have 
a disproportionate influence on human decisionmaking, at the expense of 
background probabilities. See, e.g., AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequence and Probability, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus 
Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2006); Norbert Schwarz & 
Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and 
Content of Recall as Distinct Source of Information, in HEURISTICS & BIASES: 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin 
& Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121-30 (1993). 
73 See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 39, §1.2, at 55-66. 
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imposes on the parties and the court and the incentives or 
impediments it creates for post-litigation bargaining. To shape 
private decisionmaking at or before the time of taking, without 
judicial intervention, a property rule must be established by 
determinate legal rules that define the entitlement to be protected, 
the conditions on which the property-rule remedy is available, and 
the extent of the sanction it imposes on takers. 
 In the sections that follow I shall assume that it is possible 
to create property rules in this form and that the errors likely to 
result from blunt remedial rules are not prohibitive. The question I 
address here is whether there is any logical connection between 
property-rule rules and property rights. 
 
  A.  Property Rights 
 The first step in examining the relationship between 
property rules and property rights is to explain what makes a right 
a property right. In this section, I set out my own views on the 
subject.74 I begin, however, with the account of property rights 
developed by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, which has much 
in common with, and has contributed to, my own understanding of 
property.75 
 Merrill and Smith defend a traditional definition of 
property rights as in rem rights with respect to things.76 Property 
rights are standardized rights of control over resources, held by an 
indefinite class of rightholders and binding on an indefinite class of 
dutyholders. Rather than attaching directly to rightholders as 
personal rights, they attach by virtue of the rightholder’s legal 
relationship to a thing––the relationship of ownership.77 
 Property rights, understood as in rem rights over things, 
                                                
74 I have attempted in previous writings to define the essential characteristics of 
property rights, never with complete success. See Emily Sherwin, Three 
Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1927, 1928-33 (2007); Emily Sherwin, Two-and Three-
Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1075, 1077-80 (1997). 
75 Merrill and Smith have elaborated their theory in a series of articles including, 
among others. See Merrill, supra note 5; Merrill & Smith, Optimal 
Standardization, supra note 5; Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 
5; Merrill & Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 5; Smith, Property, supra 
note 2; Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2. 
76 See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 780-89; Merrill & 
Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 357-66, 385-94. 
77 See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 783-89. Merrill & 
Smith, Law and Economics, supra note 5, at 358-60. Merrill and Smith suggest 
that, while property rights are inherently in rem, not all in rem rights are 
property rights. See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 778. 
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have several distinguishing features. First, they take a limited 
number of forms, defined in simple terms that can easily be 
understood by owners and dutyholders.78 Second, they establish a 
regime of “exclusion:” the rules of ownership give owners the right 
to exclude third parties from the things they own. The right to 
exclude others from a thing has the effect of “bundling” together 
different uses of resources.79 In contrast to a “governance” regime, 
in which legal rules identify and regulate particular resource uses 
that may conflict, a regime of exclusion allows the owner of a 
thing to choose among a range of possible resource uses 
encompassed by the thing.80 
 Merrill and Smith are primarily concerned with efficient 
use of resources. In particular, they argue that exclusionary 
property rights contribute to efficiency by reducing the costs 
associated with gathering and marshaling information about 
resources. Rules that assign rights over a simply defined thing 
make it easy for the indefinite class of duty holders to understand 
their legal positions, and thus to acquire, or to abstain from taking, 
the resources in question.81 Further, by delegating the choice 
among uses to a designated owner, exclusionary property rights 
avoid the need for legal officials to distinguish among and rank 
specific uses of resources.82 Courts (or other legal officials) make 
only the “second-order” decision to delegate, leaving more costly 
“first-order” decisions about which use is best to the owner.83 
Rights of this kind reduce the cost of information because the 
owner is ordinarily in a better position than officials to gather 
information about resource use. The owner is closer to the 
resources, and the owner is in a position to postpone 
decisionmaking and take advantage of future opportunities.84 
                                                
78 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 5. 
79 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 978-84, 1728, 1759-60. 
80 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 1722-24; Smith, Property, supra note 2, 
at 1754-63. 
81 See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 5, at 26-34; Merrill 
& Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 794. 
82 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1755-61, Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, 
at 981-84. 
83 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1760-61, Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, 
at 975, 984. 
84 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 985 (suggesting that owners are 
normally “the least-cost generators of information about assets” because they are 
close to the assets and receive offers from potential purchasers); Smith, 
Property, supra note 2, at 1763 (noting that the optimal time for valuing 
resources may be in the future). 
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 Thus, for Merrill and Smith, information cost benefits 
explain and justify rights of exclusion, which are the essence of 
property. In Smith’s words, “the traditional intuitions that property 
rules afford stability of expectations, permit planning, and allow 
owners to invest in assets are incompletely theorized versions of” 
the information cost argument for exclusionary property rights.85 
At the same time, Merrill and Smith also recognized that 
exclusionary property rights are not always adequate to bring about 
efficient resource use. When the value of resources can be 
increased by allowing multiple parties to make use of indivisible 
assets, the law may shift to a governance regime in which specific 
uses are regulated by contract or directly by courts or 
legislatures.86 
 My own account of property also tracks the traditional 
notion of property rights as rights of control over things. For 
present purposes, my concern is with legal property rights, created 
by lawmaking authorities to serve various social ends.87 One 
important objective of legal property rights is to maximize the 
value of scarce resources by giving individuals the means and 
incentives necessary for productive activity.88 At minimum, a 
                                                
85 Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1784. 
86 See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 790-99 (discussing 
the advantages and disadvantages of a regime of exclusion); Smith, Exclusion, 
supra note 2, at 981-82; 1024-45 (discussing conditions favoring governance 
rules). Smith does not make clear whether rights created by a governance regime 
for resources should also count as “property” rights. In the discussion that 
follows I assume that they do not. 
87 Private property may or may not have deontological moral foundations. I set 
this question aside for the purpose of analyzing legal rights. For discussion of 
the moral aspects of private property rights, see generally, LAWRENCE C. 
BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); STEPHEN R. 
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 292-314 (1990); JEREMY WALDRON, THE 
RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). 
88 See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 87, at 57-74; Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of 
Legislation, chs. VII-VIII (C.K. Ogden ed. 1931); John Stuart Mill, 
Utilitarianism ch. V (Oskar Piest ed., 1957); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory 
of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356-57 (1967). Legal property 
rights are consequentially related to several important ends of a liberal society. 
They contribute to welfare by supporting productivity, and they contribute to 
political freedom (which can be viewed either as a good in itself or a further 
building block for general welfare) by providing individuals with economic 
independence from government. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 87, at 75-80; 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962). At the same time, 
property rights may also contribute in various ways to the maintenance of bonds 
between individuals and the community. See, e.g., EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, THE 
PROBLEM WITH LAND (forthcoming) (discussing various values landowners 
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property right capable of performing this function requires an 
ascertainable legal thing and an assignment of the thing to an 
ascertainable legal owner. The medium for creation of property 
rights is language: to define the objects of property rights (legal 
things) and assign them to owners, the law relies on rules that are 
determinate enough to be understood and applied by private parties 
who may be interested in the resources at stake. 
 Objects of property may be physical things recognized by 
law as the subject matter of property rights, or they may be 
conceptual things that exist only by virtue of the rules that define 
them, if their conceptual contours are clear. They are “things” in 
the sense that they are broader than, and exist independently of, 
particular activities in which the owner may engage or particular 
benefits the owner hopes to derive from their use. The legal things 
that form the basis of property rights are subjects of enterprise and 
choice by owners, which the owner can act on in various ways. 
This is another way of stating the point made by Merrill and Smith, 
that property rights “bundle” potential uses of valuable resources.89 
 Objects of property include, for example, possessory 
interests in land or chattels; future interests; defined intangibles 
such as mortgages, patents, and copyrights; easements that allow 
the holder a range of use rights within a defined area of the 
servient owner’s land; and contract rights calling for future transfer 
of a legal thing under defined conditions. The component parts of 
one’s body are, potentially, objects of property, although current 
law is ambivalent about assigning the right of ownership.90 What 
these various legal things have in common is that they provide 
objectively defined arenas for value-producing activity and choice. 
 Ownership is control of a legal thing. The law assigns 
objects of property to identifiable owners, and thus delegates to 
owners the choice among potential resource uses. As Merrill and 
Smith observe, the rules of property do not identify all possible 
uses of legal things and designate them as permissible or 
impermissible by owners. Instead, owners are permitted to make 
whatever uses of the legal things assigned to them are not 
otherwise prohibited by law. Ownership is, in effect, a range of 
choice about what to do with a legal thing.91 
                                                                                                         
derive from their property, including membership in a community).  
89 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
90 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487-97 (Cal. 
1990) (refusing to recognize a property right in cell lines derived from cells 
removed from the plaintiff’s spleen). 
91 I do not mean to deny that legal ownership may carry responsibilities. Within 
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 Determinacy is a fundamental characteristic of property 
rights.92 To permit private parties to make effective use of 
resources, the rules that define objects of property and assign them 
to owners must operate outside and prior to adjudication of 
particular conflicts. If property rights are conceived of merely as 
the outcomes of litigation over conflicting uses of resources, they 
lose both their capacity to support private productive activity and 
their distinctiveness from other legal rights.93 Most valuable uses 
of resources can be the subject of rights; what distinguishes a 
property right is legal rules that define objects of property and 
assign control over those objects to owners in advance of 
decisionmaking about resource use. 
 My account of property rights intersects in several ways 
with that of Merrill and Smith. Property rights, as I have described 
them, are based on legal things, which naturally “bundle” together 
potential uses of resources. For the same reason, property rights as 
I have described them tend naturally to operate in rem. Legal 
things that encompass a variety of potential uses are likely to be of 
interest to a variety of potential users; therefore assignment of a 
legal thing to a given owner creates an indefinite number of 
dutyholders.  
 Most importantly, both accounts emphasize the form of 
property rights. For Merrill and Smith, highly determinate rights—
specifically, simple rights of exclusion that rely on the boundaries 
of things to determine permissible uses—generate the information 
cost benefits that support property rights. In my account, 
determinacy is foundational. Highly determinate rules are the 
                                                                                                         
a positivist and consequentialist account of property rights, the idea that property 
rights entail and protect a range of choice does not imply that they are entirely a 
matter of prerogative. The imposition of duties on owners is quite consistent 
with a set of rights created for social ends. Analytically, however, it seems to me 
that one must first define the minimum features of ownership—what the owner 
has—before determining what duties attach. 
92 See Merrill, supra note 5 (discussing the function of determinate rules in 
property law); see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (noting the tension between rules and broader 
standards in property law). 
93 For particularly strong expression of the view that property rights are simply 
the outcome of legal disputes over use of resources, see Joseph L. Sax, Takings 
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964) (Property is “the value which 
each owner has left after the inconsistencies between the two competing owners 
have been resolved.”). See also Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of 
Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1980) (arguing that the property has no distinct meaning in 
modern law). 
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means by which diverse uses are bundled into legal things and 
assigned to owners; without the support of determinate legal rules, 
litigation-independent property rights of the kind I describe cannot 
exist.94 
 The points that Merrill and Smith have made about 
property rights and information costs are quite persuasive. I would 
clarify, however, that determinate property rights do not simply 
capture an information advantage associated with ownership; they 
create the advantage. Fixed rights over determinate legal things 
establish both the special proximity of owners to resources and the 
long term interest that enables owners to make optimal choices 
over time. I shall return to this point in later sections. 
 
B.  Property Rights and Property Rules 
 I have characterized property rights as rights that define 
legal things and assign them to individual owners by means of 
determinate rules. Property rules are remedies designed to prohibit 
unilateral violations of rights; they stand in contrast to liability 
rules, which permit rights violations upon payment of a price. True 
property rules, defined in advance of litigation, must take the form 
of rules. Property rule rules impose fully deterrent penalties, under 
determinate conditions, for protection of determinate rights. In this 
section, I take up the question what relation, if any, property rules 
bear to property rights. 
 Despite the similarity of terms, property rules, at least as 
they are employed by courts, are not coextensive with property 
rights. Courts often grant prohibitive remedies at the conclusion of 
litigation to protect rights that do not involve control of legally 
defined things.95 There are also instances of true property rule 
protection, or something close to true property rule protection, for 
non-property rights.96 Yet, as noted earlier, true property rules are 
                                                
94 I am assuming that, at least within an important core of application, language 
is capable of conveying determinate meaning. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, 
LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 34-89 (1992); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132-
44 (1961); Schauer, supra note 8, at 53-68; Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, 
Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1993). 
95 To cite just a few examples, courts frequently enjoin civil rights violations and 
invasions of privacy. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 39, § 7.4(4), at 348-53; § 7.3(5), 
at 326-29. 
96 For example, courts routinely enter discovery orders to protect procedural 
rights. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a), (b) (authorizing discovery orders and imposing 
sanctions for failure to comply). They also routinely grant protective orders to 
prevent domestic violence. See, e.g., JOHN DE WITT GREGORY, PETER N. 
SWISHER & SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 221-22 (2005) 
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most common in the area of property rights. 
 
1.  Some Explanations for the Use of Property Rules to      
                         Secure Property Rights 
 Several commentators have offered explanations for the 
convergence between property rights and property rules. Kaplow 
and Shavell, for example, propose that property rules are likely to 
lead to more efficient resource allocation than liability rules in 
cases involving possession of physical things because of the 
special values associated with things.97 Specifically, the value of a 
physical thing typically has a common component, shared by both 
owners and takers, and an idiosyncratic component, special to 
particular individuals. Idiosyncratic value is likely to be higher for 
owners than for takers, both because the owner selected the thing 
for reasons of importance to him or her and because the owner has 
already put the thing to use.98 A well-designed liability rule will 
reflect both the average common value of the thing and the average 
owner’s idiosyncratic value. 
 The potential for inefficient takings arises when the actual 
common value of a given thing exceeds the average common value 
reflected in liability-rule damages by an amount greater than the 
average owner’s idiosyncratic value. In that case, takers have 
reason to take, because, by taking and paying the price (average 
common value plus average idiosyncratic value), they will realize 
the extra common value of the thing. Given the assumption that 
owners’ idiosyncratic value is higher on average than takers’ 
idiosyncratic value, the result is inefficient because the owner’s 
combined value (actual common value plus his or her own, 
presumptively higher, idiosyncratic value) is higher on average 
than the taker’s value.99 
                                                                                                         
(summarizing state statutes). 
97 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 759-63. In addition to the valuation 
problems discussed here, Kaplow and Shavell cite the difficulty that owners of 
things face in bargaining around a liability rule when the value they place on 
their property exceeds the price fixed by the rule: to protect their positions, they 
must bargain with an indefinite number of potential takers. See id. at 764-67. 
Kaplow and Shavell also argue that when bargaining is not possible (or fails) 
owners whose value exceeds the price fixed by a liability rule have reason to re-
take their property, resulting in wasteful expenditure, or to invest in excessive 
precautions against takings. See id. at 767-69. 
98 Id. at 760. 
99 Id. at 761-62. Others have proposed that the problems of correlated value and 
reciprocal taking identified by Kaplow and Shavell can be addressed through 
refinements in liability rules. See Ayres & Goldbart, Correlated Values, supra 
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 Henry Smith approaches the problem from a different 
angle. Smith is not primarily interested in which type of rule, as 
between property rules and liability rules, will produce the most 
efficient allocation of resources between parties when uses 
conflict. Instead, he is concerned with the costs of gathering 
information about the use and value of resources, and particularly 
with the question which among possible decisionmakers can gather 
and apply information about resources most effectively.100 In a 
“governance” regime, government officials (courts or legislatures) 
define possible uses and decide which of those uses should have 
priority. In an “exclusionary” regime, officials confer rights of 
exclusion on private owners, and in this way delegate the task of 
identifying and choosing among possible uses to owners.101 
Owners have informational advantages over official 
decisionmakers, both because they are closer to the resources 
encompassed by the things they own, and because their long-term 
interest in those things allows them to select among present and 
future uses of resources.102 Therefore, at least when there is no 
strong reason to permit (and regulate) multiple uses of indivisible 
resources by multiple users, a legal regime that relies on rights of 
exclusion reduces information-gathering costs. 
 Smith links property rules to rights of exclusion and the 
information cost advantages they produce. Owners of property are 
entitled to exclude the world from bluntly defined things that 
bundle together various uses and attributes of resources. Property 
rules refer to the same blunt standard of exclusion and prohibit acts 
that cross the legal boundary defined by the right.103 Consequently, 
                                                                                                         
note 2; Ayres & Goldbart, Optimal Delegation, supra note 5. 
 Keith Hylton offers another argument for property rules based on 
subjective (or idiosyncratic) value. See Hylton, supra note 2, at 151-68. Hylton 
argues that property rules are more effective in protecting actual subjective 
values. Therefore property rules are superior to liability rules in settings in 
which the costs that result from failure to protect subjective values (including 
weakened incentives for productivity, costs of owner self-protection) exceed the 
costs of misallocation. See id. at 167-68. Hylton, however, does not limit his 
argument to takings of things: he argues that subjective values are at least as 
significant in cases of harmful externalities. See id. at 168-70. 
100 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1724. 
101 See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 790-99; Smith, 
Exclusion, supra note 2, at 978-79; Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1755-63. 
102 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 985; Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 
1763. 
103 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 1005 (“To implement a property rule, 
courts can just monitor the rough variable––such as entry–– . . . without having 
to evaluate individual uses.”); Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1753-54, 1758 
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courts applying property rules never become involved in 
identifying, comparing, and valuing particular uses of resources. A 
liability rule, in contrast, requires official decisionmakers to 
identify and value potential uses of resources in order to set an 
accurate price for violations of the right.104  
 Much of the savings in information cost Smith cites derives 
from the right of exclusion itself, which delegates the choice 
among uses to owners. Yet, Smith also suggests two ways in which 
deterrent property rules contribute to, or capitalize on, the 
information cost benefits of exclusionary property rights. First, as 
just noted, property rules preserve the delegation of 
decisionmaking responsibility to owners while liability rules allow 
takers to force an official valuation of the resources at stake. 
Forced valuation has a number of adverse consequences. Most 
obviously, officials incur the direct costs of identifying and valuing 
particular uses.105 Further, because the valuation and transfer 
occurs immediately, owners lose their ability to postpone 
decisionmaking and take advantage of higher-valued opportunities 
for future use.106 Finally, the prospect that takers may force courts 
to value particular uses and attributes of resources may encourage 
owners or potential takers to manipulate the “signals” courts rely 
on to determine value.107 
 Second, protecting exclusionary property rights with 
property rules rather than liability rules avoids wasteful 
maneuvering by owners and takers. One source of difficulty under 
liability rules is opportunistic taking.108 Opportunism is a worry 
                                                                                                         
(“Because the signals used in the exclusion strategy are on/off, they are naturally 
paired with property rules.”). 
104 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 1, at 1005; Smith, Property, supra note 1, at 
1758. Once rights of exclusion are in place, courts can refer to values the market 
has placed on the same bluntly legal package of uses. Yet, as Smith explains, the 
market measure is not an accurate measure of the value an owner places on the 
package because it does not capture uses that have not yet been discovered, or 
that the owner has discovered but cannot effectively communicate to the court. 
See Smith, Property, supra note 2 at 1775-76. 
105 Of course, even under a property rule rule, courts will have to incur the costs 
of valuation in accident cases, in which deterrence is not an option. 
106 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1763-64. 
107 See id. at 1764-68. Smith also argues that the divided entitlement generated 
by a liability rule will add to the costs incurred by third parties who wish to 
acquire, or to avoid violating, a right. See id. at 1768-70; Merrill & Smith, 
Optimal Standardization, supra note 5, at 26-34. As long as the underlying right 
is a blunt right of exclusion from a determinately defined thing, however, a 
liability rule does not appear to pose a significantly greater risk of confusion. 
108 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 985-86; Smith, Property, supra note 2, 
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because courts fixing prices for violation of exclusionary rights 
must rely on generalizations about classes of assets. Smith 
suggests, plausibly, that although owners have better information 
about their own assets than takers, takers are likely to have better 
information than courts about the assets they are considering 
taking. As a result, takers are able to make more refined 
generalizations than courts and to target assets that courts will 
probably undervalue. It follows that liability rules encourage 
wasteful investment by takers in information about vulnerable 
assets.109 They may also discourage owners from investing in the 
information that makes their assets valuable, and therefore 
vulnerable.110 A related form of waste occurs when owners incur 
expenses to protect information they have developed about their 
assets. 
 It is worth noting that, although Kaplow and Shavell and 
Smith approach the problem of property rule protection for 
property rights in quite different ways, they concur in the 
assumption that courts have established true property rules, 
providing for protection of determinate rights, by fully deterrent 
sanctions under specified conditions. This is easiest to see in the 
case of Kaplow and Shavell: Kaplow and Shavell are concerned 
with inefficient takings by takers anticipating liability rules that 
systematically undervalue harm in cases of common value. 
Accordingly, their argument addresses the choice between a 
liability rule rule and a property rule rule that will effectively deter 
takings.111 
 The relation between Smith’s argument and the prospective 
effect of property rules is more complex. The primary set of 
reasons Smith offers in favor of property rules relates to the 
superior ability of owners, in comparison to courts, to identify and 
assess particular uses of resources.112 It might appear, therefore, 
that the benefits he attributes to property rules come into play at 
the point of litigation: by adopting a property rule at the conclusion 
of litigation, the court avoids the need to determine and value the 
uses of assets. 
 Yet, Smith’s arguments, like Kaplow’s and Shavell’s, 
ultimately depend on the presence of true property rules. Only a 
                                                                                                         
at 1774-85. 
109 See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 986; Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 
1780. 
110 See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 1785-90. 
111 See id. at 1785-90. 
112 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
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property rule rule, providing for property rule protection in 
determinate classes of cases, can deter the decision to take and 
definitively prevent takers from forcing courts to engage in 
valuation. More importantly, the information cost advantages 
Smith associates with ownership depend in part on the presence of 
true property rules. One reason why owners are superior 
decisionmakers is that they can postpone decisionmaking and 
speculate on future uses of the resources they control. Yet, if the 
form of protection is not settled in advance, takings may occur, 
courts may choose to apply liability rules, and any future uses the 
owner had in mind may be preempted. Thus, in the absence of a 
property rule rule, the possibility of a liability rule decision in a 
particular case reduces the expected value of any future uses the 
owner has in mind and undercuts the information cost advantage 
on which the argument for property rules depends.113 
 
2. The Interdependence of Property Rights, Property     
    Rules, and Rules 
 The points made by Kaplow and Shavell and by Smith help 
to explain the convergence in practice between deterrent remedies 
and property rights. Of course, Kaplow and Shavell and Smith 
endorse property rules for quite different reasons: Kaplow and 
Shavell argue that property rules, applied to property rights, will 
result in fewer inefficient takings and therefore to a better 
allocation of resources between owners and takers. Smith argues 
that, apart from the final allocation of resources between parties, 
property rules, securing exclusionary property rights, promote 
efficiency by delegating decisions about the use of resources to the 
party best positioned to gather and deploy relevant information. 
There may, however, be common ground between the insights 
these authors provide. Moreover, the combined implications of 
                                                
113 This point exposes a potential difficulty in securing the information costs and 
benefits that Smith associates with exclusion. As Smith recognizes, the law must 
employ both exclusion and governance strategies to maximize value in different 
settings. See Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract, supra note 5, at 790-99; 
Smith, Exclusion, supra note 2, at 981, 1024-45. Yet the respective domains of 
exclusion and governance may be difficult to capture in the form of a 
determinate rule. I am grateful to Eduardo Peñalver for this observation. 
 The second set of reasons Smith offers for property rules 
unquestionably relies on true property rules. Unless intentional takings are 
effectively deterred, takers will invest in information that will aid them in 
spotting owners whose interests are likely to be undervalued by liability rules, 
and owners will invest in preventative measures that would not be necessary 
under a true property rule. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
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their arguments illustrate the importance, and the creative 
potential, of legal form. 
 Summarizing once again: Kaplow and Shavell show that 
property rules are superior to standard liability rules based on 
average victim harm because of the special combination of 
common values and idiosyncratic values likely to accompany 
possession of things. In cases of high common value, a liability 
rule will result in unilateral takings although the higher 
idiosyncratic value of owners makes taking inefficient.114 Kaplow 
and Shavell refer to rights to tangible things, but their argument 
can easily be extended to any legal thing that supports a range of 
uses and is the subject of exclusionary rights. 
 Smith observes that property rights operate by packaging 
an indefinite number and variety of potential resource uses into a 
bounded asset and giving the owner a right to exclude others from 
the asset. This effectively allows the owner to choose among the 
uses encompassed by the asset. Delegation of choice to the owner 
is efficient because the owner has special access to information 
about resource use.115 
 Here I would add the point made earlier, that the 
advantages of owners in gathering and processing information 
about resources are not natural facts about the world.116 The 
owner’s information advantage comes from proximity to an asset 
and from a continuing interest in the asset, which allows the owner 
to compare present and future uses. Proximity and continuity of 
interest, however, are consequences of the owner’s legal right of 
exclusion: they depend on the rules of law that “bundle” potential 
uses into recognized legal assets and give owners the right to deny 
access to others. In the terms I have used to describe property 
rights, proximity and continuity of interest, and therefore access to 
information, depend on legal rules that define determinate objects 
of property and assign those objects to owners.117 
                                                
114 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. A liability rule further along 
the continuum of deterrence might be optimal in theory. See Ayres & Goldbart, 
Correlated Values, supra note 5, at 135-46. But the ideal liability rule rule, 
capable of affecting decisions about taking, may be outside the practical 
capacity of courts. 
115 See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Smith appears to recognize this 
but does not spell out its implications. See Smith, Property, supra note 2, at 
1777 (“[T]he values of the parties . . . depend in part on the choice of rule that 
protects the entitlement.”). 
117 In this respect, property rights and contract rights are parallel. The core 
explanation for legal enforcement of contractual promises is reliance on the part 
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 The advantages owners have in identifying and evaluating 
potential resource uses, which derive from determinate 
exclusionary property rights, make them superior decisionmakers 
in a range of cases. These advantages also help to explain the 
special components of value that Kaplow and Shavell cite in 
defense of property rule protection for possessory interests in 
things.118 A legal right to possession of a thing is, of course, a right 
of exclusion. The common value (shared by owners and takers) of 
a right to exclusive possession of a thing is likely to be based at 
least in part on the proximity to resources the rightholder enjoys. 
Similarly, the idiosyncratic value such a right holds for existing 
owners is likely to be based at least in part on investments the 
owner has made in the expectation of continued possession.  In 
other words, the values that give property rules an edge over 
liability rules for purposes of resource allocation in property cases 
are based on the information-based advantages that ownership 
confers. These advantages, in turn, depend on the legal rules that 
create exclusionary property rights. 
 Thus, property rules are connected to property rights in two 
interrelated ways. First, property rules reinforce the delegation of 
decisionmaking authority to owners that accompanies property 
rights. They prevent takers from forcing courts to identify and 
value uses of resources, and they ensure continuity of control for 
owners. Second, given the information-based advantages that 
owners derive from exclusionary property rights backed by 
property rules, property rules can lead to a more efficient 
allocation of resources between owners and takers. In each case, 
however, the benefits of a property rule depend on its capacity to 
affect decisionmaking prior to litigation. In each case, therefore, 
only true property rules, embodied in determinate rules, will 
operate as desired. 
  
                                                                                                         
of promisees. Justified reliance, however, is not an exogenous fact; it depends 
on the expectation that contractual promises will be enforced, which depends in 
turn on legal rules providing for enforcement. The independent reason for 
enforcement of contractual promises is not reliance itself, but the social value of 
reliance. Reliance leads to productive investment; therefore, to capture the value 
of reliance, lawmakers establish rules that define valid contracts and provide for 
their enforcement. The scheme, and the value it yields, depends on legal rules 
that are reasonably determinate in advance of agreement. See L.L. Fuller & 
William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE 
L.J. 52, 63-64 (1946); Andrei Marmor, Should Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, 11 
LEGAL THEORY 27, 33 (2005). 
118 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Property rights define legal things and assign them to 
owners. As a result, owners can choose among permissible uses of 
resources encompassed by the things they own, and their proximity 
to and continuing interest in those things equip them to choose 
efficiently. Deterrent property rules ensure the continuity that 
makes property rights valuable to owners and to society. Once 
property rights are securely in place, the value they generate also 
makes property rules a more efficient response to the possibility of 
unilateral taking. To achieve these results, however, both property 
rights and property rules must be implemented by general, 
determinate, and authoritative legal rules.  
 Coordination among decisionmakers is frequently cited as a 
beneficial consequence of general, determinate, and authoritative 
rules.119 The advantages of property rules identified by Kaplow 
and Shavell, Smith, and others are special types of coordination 
benefits associated with institution of property, which help to 
explain the special connection between property rights and 
determinate legal rules. Yet, because the benefits associated with 
property rights and property rules derive from legal rules, they 
depend on the ability of courts to establish and maintain rules. 
 A rule-based body of law faces two significant obstacles. 
First, determinate rules are naturally overinclusive and 
underinclusive, and it is difficult and possibly irrational for courts 
to apply them when the outcomes they prescribe appear contrary to 
the purposes of the rules, or simply unfair. Second, when judges 
themselves act as rulemakers, as they often do in the case of basic 
property rights and remedial rules, they are prone to make 
mistakes. Judges make rules in the context of adjudication, and 
their choice of rules may be affected by the facts of the cases 
before them. The facts of particular cases, however, are not always 
representative of the majority of cases that will be governed by the 
rule. When judge-made rules are influenced by the facts of 
unrepresentative cases, they may not perform well over the long 
run.120 
  
 Both property rights and property rules are vulnerable to 
                                                
119 See supra note 65. 
120 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 
(2006); see also Rachlinski, supra note 72 (noting different cognitive defects 
affecting judicial and legislative rulemaking). Schauer points out that the same 
case-specific biases that lead judges to craft less-than-optimal rules can also lead 
them to overrule sound rules. Schauer, supra, at 910-12. 
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problems of this kind. Property rights implicate questions of 
distributive justice, and their distributive consequences in 
particular cases may lead judges to make exceptions to rules or to 
announce unsound rules. Property rules come into focus at the 
remedial stage of litigation, when judges are especially likely to 
focus on the factual details of the cases before them. 
 Judges do appear to recognize the importance of rules in 
the area of property. Yet, particularly when it comes to remedies, 
there will never be perfect adherence to rules. This is a fact of legal 
life, which casts a shadow over enterprise of predicting the effects 
of remedial choice.  
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